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Abstract
“There are no gaps in logical space”, writes Lewis (1986), giving voice to
sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying
to make this sentiment precise turn out to conﬂict with one another. One is a
pattern idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible”. Another
is a cut and paste idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world
that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” Jumping off
from discussions from Forrest and Armstrong (1984) and Nolan (1996), we use
resources from model theory to show the inconsistency of certain packages of
combinatorial principles and the consistency of others.
1 Two Combinatorial Ideas
A famous Humean slogan has it that there are no necessary connections between
distinct existences. (“There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if
we consider these objects in themselves,” Hume 1978, 1.III.vi.) Many contem-
porary philosophers have endorsed this kind of “combinatorialist” idea: “there
should be no arbitrary limits to what’s possible” (Sider 2009), there are “no gaps
in logical space” (Lewis 1986, 87), “there are no brute necessities” (Dorr 2008;
see also e.g. Kleinschmidt 2015). This picture might be motivated epistemologi-
cally: brute necessities would make trouble for any tight connection between what’s
conceivable and what’s metaphysically possible. Or it might be motivated meta-
physically: arbitrary-looking constraints on metaphysical possibility, whether aris-
ing from primitive essences, powers, laws, or the the necessary will of God, seem
occult. We won’t be evaluating these motivations here: rather, we’ll be examining
logical limits on what such a view could consistently say.
Here’s one way of trying to articulate the Humean idea:
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Any pattern of instantiation of any fundamental properties and relations is
metaphysically possible (Wang 2013, 538; Saucedo 2011; see also Armstrong
1989, 49).
This “pattern” idea is still not completely clear. If “any pattern” means “any actu-
ally instantiated realized pattern”, then this says no more than the truism that what
is actual is possible; and if it means “any pattern which is metaphysically possible
to instantiate, it says no more than the tautology that what is possible is possible.1
We’ll be exploring ways of spelling out this “pattern” idea. But in response to simi-
lar difﬁculties, David Lewis concluded that similar principles “cannot be salvaged as
principles of plenitude”2 and “we need a new way to say … that there are possibili-
ties enough, and no gaps in logical space” (1986, 87). So Lewis proposed a second,
mereological way of articulating the combinatorial idea—the “cut and paste” idea.
Possibility is governed by a combinatorial principle. We can take apart the
distinct elements of a possibility and rearrange them. We can remove some
of them altogether. We can reduplicate some or all of them. We can replace
an element of one possibility with an element of another. When we do, since
there is no necessary connection between distinct existences, the result will
itself be a possibility (2009, 209; see also 1986, sec. 1.8; Nolan 1996; for
critical discussion see Wilson 2015).
(In Lewis’s earlier work (1986) he mainly applies this combinatorial idea to spa-
tiotemporal parts of possible worlds. But in this 2009 presentation, he also tries to
capture some of the pattern idea within the cut and paste idea—rearranging, as
he puts it, “not only spatiotemporal parts, but also abstract parts—speciﬁcally, the
fundamental properties”.)
It turns out that there are serious problems for straightforwardly unifying these two
different combinatorial ideas: natural ways of spelling out the “pattern” idea and
the “cut and paste” idea are inconsistent with one another. Peter Forrest and David
Armstrong (1984) attempted to show this (though this isn’t exactly how they put it);
Daniel Nolan (1996) showed that their argument was dialectically ineffective, and
the idea has since been neglected. But different arguments do successfully reveal
conﬂict between the two combinatorial ideas. We’ll show the inconsistency of a
certain combinatorialist package; we’ll go on to also show how to devise consistent
alternative packages based on the “pattern” idea. Our main technical tools for this
1Wang and Saucedo both recognize these difﬁculties. They each consider ways of articulating the
slogan in terms of the logical consistency of certain sentences; we’ll come back to this idea in section 5.
Note also that Wang puts the slogan forward as a target, not as her own view: see footnote 9.
2He attributes the point to Peter van Inwagen, speciﬁcally concerning the slogan: “absolutely
every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is.”
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project come from model theory: we’ll deploy the mathematical theory of relational
structures to regiment the intuitive notion of patterns of instantiation.
We should note that these results don’t rely on Lewis’s brand of modal realism,
nor indeed on any particular commitments about the nature of possibilia. Neither
do they rely (as some arguments have) on the idea that possible worlds or possible
objects form a set. Furthermore, these consistency and inconsistency results have
philosophical ramiﬁcations for many views other than a full-blown Humean picture
of metaphysical possibility. They apply even if just certain special aspects of real-
ity are freely recombinable—a single relation, perhaps. They also apply to other
modalities besides metaphysical possibility. For instance, parallel issues arise for
views that say certain qualitative patterns of instantiation are epistemically possible.
(Recall that Hume’s original target was a priori necessary connections.) So our results
should not just be of interest to the metaphysician, but also to the epistemologist.
2 Patterns of Properties
A well-known argument due to Forrest and Armstrong (1984) reveals that a certain
kind of combinatorialism is inconsistent. We’ll present a variant of this argument.
The variant is close to the original in spirit, but while the original version only tar-
geted Lewis’s speciﬁc modal realist conception of possible worlds, our version ab-
stracts away from those commitments: it doesn’t depend on any particular view of
the nature of worlds. We’ve also taken the opportunity to put things in terms that
are continuous with arguments and ideas we present later in this paper.3
The Forrest–Armstrong argument targets the combination of two principles. The
ﬁrst principle is a version of the “pattern” idea: given a possible worldW,
3Throughout this paper we freely appeal to the truth at every possible world of ZFCU—standard
set theory adapted to a setting with urelements. (We do not assume Urelement Set—that there is a
set of non-sets.) We also make the simplifying assumptions that set-membership is rigid, and that it is
not contingent what pure sets there are.
We make some additional assumptions about the logic of possible worlds. First, we assume that
truth-at-a-world is closed under logical consequence:
Closure If 𝜓 is a logical consequence of 𝜙1, 𝜙2…, and at W, 𝜙1, and at W, 𝜙2, and …, then at W,
𝜓 .
But we will qualify this principle later in this section: see footnotes 7 and 13. We also assume for
simplicity that it is not contingent what worlds there are, nor what is true at them: that is, for any world
W at which 𝜙, at every world V, W is a world at which 𝜙. (Given natural background assumptions
about the connection between modal operators and possible worlds, this is tantamount to assuming
the modal logic S5.)
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There will then be some property, F-ness … which each electron inWmay or
may not have, and may or may not have independently of whether the other
electrons in W have it. For each sub-set of the N electrons it will be possible
that precisely the electrons in that sub-set have the property F-ness” (1984,
165).
To make it more transparent that “electron” is a placeholder in the argument, we’ll
instead talk about “marbles”: these are supposed to be some kind of concrete par-
ticulars that are candidates for instantiating recombinable properties. We’ll make
this “pattern” principle precise as follows:
Property At any world, if D is the set of marbles and X is a subset of D, then at
some world: the marbles are precisely the elements of D, and the F marbles
are precisely the elements of X.
(This principle is in fact a little stronger than Forrest and Armstrong’s, since it re-
quires the “pattern world” to be one in which there are no other marbles besides the
D-marbles. Nothing important turns on this, but it will simplify some connections
later on.)
The second principle is a version of Lewis’s “cut and paste” idea:
[G]iven any number of possible worlds, W1,W2 …, there exists a possible
world, having wholly distinct [i.e., non-overlapping] parts, such that one of
these parts is an internally exactly resembling duplicate of W1 […], another
a duplicate ofW2, and so on (1984, 164).
Their argument is presented in terms of duplication (speciﬁcally targeting Lewis’s
early formulations of recombination), but we’ll put this a bit more abstractly.4 IfΩ is
a set of possible worlds, then where Forrest and Armstrong say thatW+ has distinct
duplicates of the worlds in Ω as parts, we’ll instead say “W+ disjointly embeds
Ω.” In due course we’ll give a deﬁnition of disjoint embedding, but for the moment
all that is important is this fact about it:
Enough Marbles If W+ disjointly embeds Ω, and at each world W in Ω there is
at least one marble, then atW+ there are at least as many marbles as elements
of Ω.
So our version of the principle says:
4This bypasses some concerns about the part-whole structure of possible worlds, and whether the
recombinable properties are intrinsic.
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Paste For any set of worlds Ω there is a worldW+ that disjointly embeds Ω.
Note that when Forrest and Armstrong say “any number of possible worlds” they
mean it literally: their “paste” principle only applies to worlds that have a cardinal
number. With orthodoxy, we suppose this requires that they are not too numerous
to form a set, and we’ve made this explicit in our formulation of Paste, by saying
“for any set of worlds.”5
The argument against Property and Paste relies on several background assumptions.
Forrest and Armstrong apply their “paste” principle to the plurality of all possible
worlds, which requires:
World Set There is a set of all worlds.
Similarly, when they say “the N electrons” they are implicitly assuming that the
electrons also have a cardinal number, and thus they assume:
Marble Set At any world, there is a set of all marbles.6
There are powerful arguments against these set-theoretic assumptions, and accord-
ingly we will relax them in section 4. But since that introduces extra technical com-
plications, we will assume World Set and Marble Set for now.
The argument uses two further auxiliary premises.
Possible Marble At some world, there is at least one marble.
Possibilities For any sets X and Y, if atW the Fmarbles are precisely the elements
of X, and atW the F marbles are precisely the elements of Y, then X = Y.
5Forrest and Armstrong alternatively consider applying the argument to some broader notion of
an “aggregate” of all worlds. It’s not clear what they have in mind, but they might be gesturing at a
version of the argument using plural quantiﬁcation: we take up this idea in section 4.
6Assuming that (at every world) marbles and worlds are non-sets, Marble Set and World Set are
consequences of the necessity of the more familiar Urelement Set axiom, which says that there is a set
of all non-sets.
Of course, some hold that possible worlds are sets—for example, sets of propositions. In this case
World Set would not follow from Urelement Set.
There are challenges to Urelement Set that don’t apply to Marble Set. For example, suppose that
for each marble m and any distinct sets A and B, the fusion of m and A is a distinct non-set from the
fusion of m and B. Then there will, after all, be as many non-sets as sets, violating Urelement Set (see
Uzquiano 2006). But this argument makes no trouble for Marble Set on its own.
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(Equivalently, for any distinct sets X and Y, if atW the Fmarbles are the elements of
X and atW′ the Fmarbles are the elements of Y, thenW andW′ are distinct worlds.)
This ﬁnal premise is about the uniqueness of what is true at a possible world. We’ll
return to this in a moment.7
Here is the main Forrest–Armstrong result, in our setting:
Given PossibleMarble, Marble Set, World Set, and Possibilities, it follows that
Property and Paste are not both true.
Let Ω be the set of all worlds at which there is at least one marble. (This set exists,
given World Set and the axiom of Separation.) Then by Paste, there is some world
W+ that disjointly embeds Ω, and so at W+ there are at least as many marbles as
there are worlds in Ω. By Marble Set these marbles form a set D, and by Possible
Marble D is non-empty. Then Property tells us that at W+, for each subset X of D
there is some world in Ω at which the F marbles are precisely the elements of X;
and by Possibilities these worlds are numerically distinct from one another. Thus,
at W+, there are at least as many worlds in Ω as subsets of D. So there are at least
as many members of D as subsets of D. But this contradicts a standard result of set
theory:
Cantor’s Theorem There are strictly more subsets of D than members of D.
In short, at the worldW+ we would have to have
D ≥ Ω ≥ 2D > D
which is impossible. QED.
The Forrest–Armstrong argument establishes an interesting result, but it is not one
that has dialectical force against their original target, namely David Lewis’s sys-
tem: for Lewis rejects some of the assumptions on which the argument relies (Nolan
1996).8 At a crucial point in the argument we infer that there are as many distinct
7In fact, we can derive Possibilities from our background principles, using the necessity of identity.
Suppose that at at W, X contains the F marbles, and at W, Y contains the F marbles. Then by the
unqualiﬁed version of Closure (footnote 3), together with the fact that the axiom of Extensionality is
true atW, it follows that atW, X = Y.
8Nolan puts the point like this: “[T]hey talk as if there is trans-world identity of electrons. [This is
bad] because Lewis does not think that there is any such thing, and they are supposed to be discussing
a problem for Lewis’ theory” (1996, 243, original emphasis). Strictly speaking, trans-world identity
isn’t exactly what’s at issue, but rather the haecceitistic principle that isomorphic possibilities, which
merely differ regarding which particular marbles are F, are witnessed by distinct possible worlds. But
the best-known way of rejecting this haecceitistic principle is Lewis’s, which goes by way of rejecting
trans-world identity. (It’s a bit surprising that Lewis himself did not seem to notice this problem with
the argument: for his response see Lewis 1986, sec. 2.2.)
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possible worlds as sets of marbles, since for each set of marbles X there is some world
at which just the X-marbles are F (let’s say “red”). Take the case of two singleton sets
{Mary} and {Marvin}. Then in particular, the argument requires that, given that
Mary and Marvin are distinct, the world at which just Mary is red is distinct from
the world at which just Marvin is red. But Lewis is a counterpart theorist, and a coun-
terpart theorist can resist this. For it to be true atW that just Mary is red, it sufﬁces
that Mary have some counterpart which is the only red marble in W. The same goes
for Marvin. Crucially, Lewis allows that the very same marble can be a counterpart
for both Mary and Marvin—and thus the very same world can do double-duty for
both possibilities (see Lewis 1986, 232ff.). So, for the counterpart theorist, Property
does not imply that there are as many distinct possible worlds as there are sets of
marbles. In particular, given this counterpart-theoretic gloss on truth-at-a-world,
the backround premise Possibilities fails: it can be true atW1 that Mary is red, and
also true atW2 that Mary is not red, and yet it does not follow thatW1 andW2 are
distinct.
A more general lesson is that the Forrest–Armstrong argument is only effective
against the haecceitist combinatorialist: someone who accepts both Property—which
says there are possible worlds witnessing property-distributions that differ merely
with respect to what individual marbles are like—as well as Possibilities—which
guarantees the distinctness of these possible worlds. It would be nice, then, to try
to rehabilitate a version of the argument with more general application, by only
appealing to qualitatively distinct possible worlds.
Moreover, the slogan we began with—
Any pattern of instantiation of any fundamental properties and relations is
metaphysically possible
—is much more plausible when read as a principle concerning qualitative patterns,
rather than as a constraint on de re possibilities. The de re reading is not just haec-
ceitistic, but in fact radically anti-essentialist. For example, suppose that “marbles”
include both photons and electrons, and suppose that each electron is essentially
an electron, and each photon is essentially a non-electron. Then reading “is F”
as “is an electron” would make Property false—but this essentialist picture is still
compatible with a qualitative gloss on the combinatorialist slogan.9
9Wang (2013, 539–40) raises a related objection to combinatorialism: if every pattern of instantia-
tion of fundamental properties and relations is metaphysically possible, and is located at is fundamental,
then something which is not a region could have something located at it. Qualitative pattern principles
do not have this de re modal consequence.
Wang also raises other objections which apply equally well to qualitative principles: the best con-
tenders we currently have for fundamental properties and relations don’t look especially well suited
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From here on, we’ll be focusing on principles that concern the possibility of cer-
tain sorts qualitative patterns, rather than haecceitistically loaded combinatorial
principles. (That isn’t to say we are assuming anti-haecceitism, nor are we assuming
Lewisian doctrines associated with counterpart theory. For the purposes of this pa-
per we aim to stay neutral on such questions.) In particular, rather than Forrest
and Armstrong’s Property, which is about distinct de re possibilities for the F-ness
of particular marbles, we can explore the prospects for a principle about different
qualitative patterns of F-ness over the marbles. Here’s a natural principle to try
(Nolan 1996, 243):
Property Pattern At any world, if D is the set of marbles and X is a subset of D,
then at some world: the number of marbles is the same as the cardinality of
D, and the number of F marbles is the cardinality of X.
Daniel Nolan points out that, unlike Forrest and Armstrong’s Property principle,
Property Pattern does not lead to any contradiction with Paste. We can show this
with a simple model (1996, 243–44). There is a countable inﬁnity of worlds, each
of which contains a countable inﬁnity of marbles. For each natural number n there
is a world containing just n red marbles, and another world containing just n non-
red marbles. There is also one world containing inﬁnitely many red marbles and
inﬁnitely many non-red marbles. (To see that this respects Paste we need only re-
call the standard fact that the disjoint union of countably many countable sets is
countable.)
The combinatorial idea of Property Pattern can also be generalized to patterns of
arbitrarily many properties. Doing this precisely takes a bit of work—our next task.
In what follows, in order to talk about different sorts of patterns, we will appeal to
the standard model-theoretic notion of a structure.10 Suppose P is a set of monadic
properties.11 (We’ll generalize this in the next section.) A P-structure is a pair of
to free recombination. For instance, determinate properties like having 1kg mass and having 2kg mass
are incompatible with one another, and distance relations obey geometric constraints. In this paper
our focus is on the logical limits of recombination theses: we do not really rest anything on whether
recombinable properties and relations are fundamental, or which ones they might be.
10For reference see e.g. Hodges (1997). Philosophers are most likely to be familiar with structures in
the context of the semantics for ﬁrst-order logic (e.g. Sider 2010, sec. 4.2). In that setting, the signature
of a structure—our set of properties P—is usually left implicit, and relationships between different
structures are not emphasized. Another minor difference is that in that setting structures with empty
domains are not usually allowed.
11Model theorists are usually neutral about what sort of things are the elements of a signature—
they might, for instance, be symbols or numbers. But nothing in the standard formalism prevents us
from using properties for this purpose, and we’ll ﬁnd this choice convenient.
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a set D, called the domain, and a function that takes each property F in P to some
subset of D, called the extension of F in that structure. One of the overarching
ideas of this paper is that model theory—the mathematical theory of structures—is
a valuable tool for modal theorizing.12
A marble structure is any structure whose domain contains every marble and
nothing else. For example, suppose the properties in P are just redness and circular-
ity, and there are just twomarblesMary andMarvin. Then there are sixteen marble
structures (with signature P). For instance, one structure S1 has these extensions:
S1 circular ↦ ∅red ↦ {Mary}
Another has these:
S2 circular ↦ {Marvin}red ↦ {Mary,Marvin}
Among these sixteen abstract marble structures, one is special: the one that assigns
redness just to marbles which are really red, and that assigns circularity to those
marbles which are really circular. Call this the real marble structure. In general:
If S is a marble P-structure, S is real iff, for each property F in P, the S-
extension of F includes just the F marbles.
At any world there is exactly one real marble P-structure (givenMarble Set), though
generally there are many abstract marble structures.
Structures provide a way of precisifying the idea of a “pattern of properties”, and
articulating claims about their possibility. What we still need to spell out is what it
is for a possible world to realize a certain pattern.
Remember, realizing a pattern shouldn’t require that any particular marbles instan-
tiate these properties: the pattern principle we are articulating is not haecceitistic.
For example, for the pattern represented by S1 to be metaphysically possible re-
quires that at some world there are two things, neither of which is circular and just
one of which is red. For S2, we require a world at which there are two red things,
just one of which is circular. What is it for two structures with different domains to
represent the same qualitative pattern? The standard answer is isomorphism. Struc-
tures are isomorphic iff there is a one-to-one correspondence between their domains
12The idea that combinatorial principles can be articulated in terms of structures has been sug-
gested from time to time, but not worked out at the level of detail required for the results we will be
investigating. (E.g., Bricker 1991, 608; Hazen 2004, 332.)
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which respects the extension of each property in P. (See appendix A for more ofﬁcial
statements of standard deﬁnitions.)
But also, for a world W to realize the pattern represented by S1 shouldn’t even re-
quire thatMary andMarvin exist atW. If they don’t, then it’s plausible that the struc-
ture S1 also does not exist at W. In general, we want to make “cross-world” struc-
tural comparisons, while allowing that particular marbles and marble-structures
may only exist contingently. Our strategy is to appeal to an intermediary struc-
ture whose existence is not contingent. For this purpose we will make the natural
assumption that the size and structure of the universe of pure sets does not vary from
world to world.13 This assumption is not unassailable; but if it fails, we take this to
mainly make trouble for expressing the idea of cross-world isomorphism. Presumably
this is an idea that one would like to make sense of somehow or other.14
Let a pure structure be a structure whose domain is a pure set. Given that the
universe of pure sets is ﬁxed, the existence, size, and isomorphism facts for pure
structures are also ﬁxed. Putting these ideas together, we can now say what it is for
a possible world to realize a certain pattern of properties.
A world W realizes a P-structure S iff, for some pure structure S′ which is
isomorphic to S, atW, the real marble P-structure is isomorphic to S′.
Using this deﬁnition, we can do what we set out to do, making precise the gen-
eralization of Property Pattern to arbitrarily many properties. Let P be any set of
properties.
P-Pattern At each world, for any marble P-structure S, some world realizes S.
13In addition to assuming that the existence, elements, and identities of pure sets do not vary from
world to world, we also make another more technical assumption. Counterpart theorists typically
reject Closure (see footnotes 3 and 7). Perhaps at W, Marvin is red (thanks to one of Marvin’s coun-
terparts), and at W, Marvin is green (thanks to another counterpart), but it’s not the case that at W,
Marvin is red and green. But even the counterpart theorist should accept Closure for the special case
of qualitative statements, which make no reference to any particular individuals: in that case, counter-
parts are inert. More generally, we also will assume Closure for the special case of statements which
make reference to no particular objects other than pure sets, possible worlds, or properties and rela-
tions. The counterpart theorist may still wish to resist this assumption: perhaps even abstracta bear
non-trivial counterpart relations. But exploring this view would raise extra technical complications;
we leave it to others.
14An alternative kind of non-contingent structure is available to Necessitists, who hold that (neces-
sarily) everything exists necessarily (e.g. Williamson 2002). Necessitists can make sense of cross-world
isomorphism without any need for special pure structures. For related discussion see Fritz (2013); Fritz
and Goodman (2016).
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Note that, using our deﬁnition of “realizes” and our background assumptions about
pure sets, we can derive a useful principle which is analogous to Possibilities, without
the tendentious de re commitments: each possible world tells a story which is unique
up to isomorphism.15
Structural Possibilities At any world, for any worldW and P-structures S1 and
S2, ifW realizes S1 andW realizes S2, then S1 and S2 are isomorphic.
Forrest and Armstrong’s “paste” principle was about duplication and parts. We’ve
noted that for our purposes it’s more perspicuous to discuss a different, more ab-
stract relation between worlds: disjoint embedding. An embedding is, intuitively, an
isomorphism between one structure and part of another. This is a one-to-one (but
not necessarily onto) function from the domain of one structure to the domain of
another, which respects the extension of each P-property. If there is an embedding
from S1 to S2 then we say S2 embeds S1. A structure S+ disjointly embeds a
family of structures iff there are embeddings of each of them into S+, such that the
ranges of the embeddings of different structures in the family have no elements in
common. (Again, see appendix A for more careful statements.)
We can also naturally extend these notions from structures to worlds.
A world W embeds a world V (with respect to P) iff W realizes some P-
structure S and V realizes some P-structure T such that S embeds T.
A worldW+ disjointly embeds a set of worlds Ω (with respect to P) iffW+
realizes some P-structure S+, each Ω-world W realizes some P-structure SW,
and S+ disjointly embeds the family of structures SW forW ∈ Ω.
(Earlier we appealed to Enough Marbles: if W+ disjointly embeds Ω, and at each Ω-
world there is at least one marble, then atW+ there are at least as many marbles as
Ω-worlds. This can now be derived from the deﬁnition of disjoint embedding.)
Now we can generalize Paste to arbitrary sets of properties:
P-Paste For any set of worldsΩ, there is a worldW+ that disjointly embedsΩ (with
respect to P).
15Suppose thatW realizes each of S1 and S2. That is, there are pure structuresT1 andT2 isomorphic
to S1 and S2, respectively, such that atW there is a real marble structure is isomorphic to T1, and also
atW there is a real marble structure is isomorphic to T2. We also know that atW, there is at most one
real marble structure. Since these truths-at-Wmake reference to no objects other than pure structures,
by our qualiﬁed version of Closure (see footnote 13), it follows that at W, T1 and T2 are isomorphic
to one another. Since isomorphism facts for pure structures do not vary from world to world, T1 is
isomorphic to T2, and thus S1 is isomorphic to S2.
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With these deﬁnitions, we can state a possibility result that generalizes Nolan’s ob-
servation. It turns on the existence of a certain sort of “universal” structure:
Theorem 1 Let P be any set of monadic properties. There is a P-structureUwhich
disjointly embeds isomorphic copies of every P-structure no larger than U.
(To be explicit, the size of a structure is the cardinality of its domain.) Here’s the
idea of the proof of Theorem 1. Each element of a structure has a certain proﬁle
of properties—a certain subset of P which includes just the properties that apply to
that element. We can characterize a P-structure (up to isomorphism) just by spec-
ifying how many elements it has with each different proﬁle of properties. Call this
speciﬁcation—a function from subsets of P to cardinal numbers—the structure’s
global proﬁle. We can ﬁnd a suitable inﬁnite cardinal 𝜅 so that there are only 𝜅 dif-
ferent global proﬁles for structures no bigger than 𝜅. Then we can glue together
one representative structure for each of these 𝜅 different global proﬁles in one big
structure, whose size is 𝜅 × 𝜅 = 𝜅. See appendix A for further details.
We can use Theorem 1 to give a model for P-Pattern and P-Paste (along with the
other background assumptions). The idea is that there is a world W+ that realizes
the “universal” 𝜅-sized P-structure given by Theorem 1. The set of all possible
worlds includes one representative from each isomorphism type of structure with at
most 𝜅 elements—satisfying P-Pattern. The structures realized by any set of worlds
in this model can be disjointly embedded in the universal structure realized byW+—
satisfying P-Paste.
Thus:
If P is a set of monadic properties, then P-Pattern and P-Paste are jointly
consistent (together with World Set, Marble Set, and Possible Marble).16
The Forrest–Armstrong result relied on the fact that there strictly more subsets of D
than elements of D. Theorem 1 shows that this does not carry over from particular
sets to qualitative patterns of properties. That is, there exist sets D for which there
are no more isomorphism-types of P-structures on D than elements of D.
16By “consistent” we mean having a (Kripke) model. A model assigns an arbitrary extension to
each property in P in each world in the model: each P-property plays the role of a primitive predicate.
Of course, some of these extensions may not represent realistic possibilities. For example, even if P
includes both red and colored, there is no guarantee that the extension of red is a subset of the extension
of colored. Likewise, even if P includes self-identical, there are models that leave some individuals out of
its extension in some worlds. Many absurd theses count as consistent in this formal sense. This caveat
applies to all of our consistency claims.
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It’s an important feature of this model that the grand world W+ has even more
individuals than there are properties in the set P. Indeed, the possibility result is
blocked if we add a further principle:
P-Plenitude At each world, there are at least as many properties in P as there are
marbles.
Then we can argue (for any set of monadic properties P):
GivenWorld Set, Marble Set, and PossibleMarble, it follows that P-Plenitude,
P-Pattern, and P-Paste are not all true.
We can use similar reasoning to the Forrest–Armstrong argument: let Ω be the set
of all worlds containing marbles, and let W+ disjointly embed Ω. Possible Marble
and P-Pattern ensure that, for each P-proﬁle, Ω includes some world at which some
marble has that proﬁle. So at W+ there must be at least one representative marble
with each P-proﬁle, and thus atW there are at least as many marbles as there are P-
proﬁles. Since there are strictly more P-proﬁles than properties in P, this contradicts
P-Plenitude.
D ≥ 2P > P
Note that the assumption of disjoint embeddings is dispensable for this argument.
If W+ merely embeds each world in Ω, with no regard for disjointness, this still
ensures that W+ includes at least one marble with each P-proﬁle. So (given the
background assumptions) P-Plenitude and P-Pattern also conﬂict with this weaker
principle, which drops the disjointness condition:
Overlapping P-Paste For any set of worlds Ω, there is a world W that embeds
each Ω-world.
But P-Plenitude is not obviously a well-motivated constraint. For instance, if P is a
set only containing fundamental qualitative monadic properties, then there might
well not be that many of them.17
Here are the main observations so far. Forrest and Armstrong’s argument raised a
problem for a haecceitistic package of recombination principles. These haecceitistic
17The distinction between Overlapping P-Paste and P-Paste is analogous to the distinction Nolan
(1996, 241–42) draws between the “Principle of Recombination” and the “Stronger Principle of Re-
combination”.
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principles are alien to Lewis’s worldview—and in any case, it’s more natural to un-
derstand combinatorialist slogans about “patterns of fundamental properties and
relations” as concerning qualitative patterns. Moreover, we’ve seen that qualitative
patterns of monadic properties don’t lead to the kind of cardinality explosion that
drives the Forrest–Armstrong argument. So far, this style of impossibility result
doesn’t make serious trouble for qualitative combinatorialist views.
3 Patterns of Relations
There are no obvious logical difﬁculties for qualitative recombination of monadic
properties. But when we extend these combinatorial ideas to relations, things look
quite different.
We’ll now let the signature P contain not just monadic properties, but relations of
any ﬁnite adicity. (We’ll count properties as “monadic relations”.) Call Pmonadic
iff it contains only monadic properties; otherwise, if P contains at least one relation
of adicity at least two, P is polyadic. In this more general case, a P-structure is a
pair of a domain together with a function that takes each n-adic relation F in P to
some set of ordered n-tuples of elements of D (the extension of F). Extending the
notions of isomorphism and embedding to polyadic signatures is routine; explicit
deﬁnitions are provided in appendix A for reference. With these more general deﬁ-
nitions in place, the statements of the principles in section 2—speciﬁcally, P-Pattern,
P-Paste, and Overlapping P-Paste—make sense for for a polyadic signature P with-
out any further modiﬁcation. But it turns out that these generalized principles stand
in importantly different relationships. In fact, whereas the Forrest–Armstrong-style
argument involving monadic properties didn’t end up presenting any problem for
qualitative pattern and paste principles, the same kind of argument using relations
raises serious trouble.18
The argument turns on the following mathematical fact, which is a kind of gener-
alization of Cantor’s Theorem.
Theorem 2 Let P be a polyadic signature. For any set D there are strictly more
18Kit Fine pointed out that in this respect recombination principles are closely analogous to ab-
straction principles of the sort that play a role in neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics. “Monadic”
abstraction principles, such as Hume’s Principle for cardinal numbers, are consistent, while similar
“dyadic” abstraction principles, such as the analogous principle for ordinal numbers, are inconsistent.
Furthermore, the proofs of both of these facts are closely related to ours. (See Boolos 1998, 184 and
222.)
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non-isomorphic P-structures with domain D than elements of D. In short,
IsoP D > D
This points to a crucial contrast between the monadic and polyadic cases: as we
have seen, Theorem 1 implies that this statement is false if we replace “polyadic”
with “monadic”. We’ll sketch two different proofs, using different ideas. (The two
proofs also lead to interestingly different strengthenings of Theorem 2.) Details are
again provided in appendix A.
For a warm-up, suppose D is countably inﬁnite, consider a single dyadic relation
zapping, and consider a structure Swhere zapping has the structure of the ordering of
natural numbers (so a “zero” marble zaps everything in D, including itself, another
marble “one” zaps everything in D except zero, and so on). This order structure
is rigid, in the sense from model theory: there is only one isomorphism from S to
S—namely, the identity function, which takes each element of D to itself.19
Next, suppose that in addition to the relation of zapping, P also contains one
monadic property, redness. How many ways are there to distribute redness over
the order structure given by S? That is, how many different ways are there of
extending the {zapping}-structure S to a {zapping, redness}-structure? One
way assigns redness to just the ﬁrst thing, another assigns redness to just the
odd-numbered marbles, and so on. In general, for each set X of marbles in S, there
is a corresponding P-structure SX which has the same zapping structure as S, and
which has X as the extension of redness. Furthermore, each of these structures
is qualitatively distinct.20 So there are at least as many isomorphically distinct
P-structures as subsets of D—and thus, by Cantor’s Theorem, strictly more such
structures than elements of D.
We can get from here to Theorem 2 in two steps. The ﬁrst step is to notice that
the extra monadic property of redness wasn’t really needed. Instead of varying
structures according to which elements are red, we can do the same thing with
harmless modiﬁcations of the zap-ordering itself. In the original ordering based on
the natural numbers, every element zaps itself. For each set X, we can come up
with a modiﬁed ordering SX where, instead of coloring the individuals in X red, we
switch off their self-zapping. This modiﬁed ordering still naturally matches marbles
19In other words, a rigid structure is one that has no non-trivial automorphisms, where an automor-
phism is an isomorphism from a structure to itself, and the trivial automorphism is the identity function.
This use of “rigid” is unrelated to the modal meaning common among philosophers.
20This is because any isomorphism f from SX to SY has to be, in particular, an isomorphism of the
underlying zap-structure, which means that f must be the identity function, and so, since f preserves
the extension of redness, X = Y.
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up with natural numbers. (Themarble at position n is the one which zaps everything
except for the marbles in positions before n, and perhaps itself.) In particular, SX is
still rigid, which is what we needed for the argument.
The second step is to note that the assumption that there are only countably many
marbles was inessential. In fact, a standard fact of set theory—theWell-Ordering
Principle (which is equivalent to the axiom of Choice)—says that any set can be
ordered in a way which has the same rigidity property as the natural numbers or-
dering.21
The second proof of Theorem 2 uses a different fundamental theorem from set
theory, concerning ordinals (for this formulation see e.g. Clark 2016):
Burali-Forti’s Theorem For any cardinal 𝜅, there are strictly more than 𝜅 iso-
morphically distinct well-ordered sets with at most 𝜅 elements.
For example, let 𝜅 be countable inﬁnity, and consider the dyadic relation of zapping.
There are many ways of putting non-isomorphic well-ordering zap-structures on
countable sets. It could be an 𝜔-sequence (structured just like the natural numbers),
or an 𝜔-sequence with an extra element at the tail, or two copies of an 𝜔-sequence
end to end, or an𝜔-sequence of end-to-end𝜔-sequences, and so on. What we learn
from Burali-Forti is that in fact there are uncountably many qualitatively different
order structures; and furthermore this generalizes from the countable case to any
size.
Theorem 2 has this important consequence for recombination.
Let P be polyadic. Given World Set, Marble Set, and Possible Marble, then
P-Pattern and P-Paste are not both true.
This follows from Theorem 2 the same way that the Forrest–Armstrong result fol-
lowed from Cantor’s Theorem. If Ω is the set of worlds containing marbles, and
W+ disjointly embeds Ω, then at W+ the set of marbles D is at least as large as Ω,
which (by P-Pattern and Structural Possibilities) has at least as many elements as
there are non-isomorphic structures with domain D, which by Theorem 2 is strictly
larger than D. In short:
D ≥ Ω ≥ IsoP D > D
21As it turns out, the principle we really need here—that every set is the domain of some rigid
relational structure—is strictly weaker than Choice. Like Choice, though, it is independent of ZF set
theory. See Hamkins and Palumbo (2012).
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Contradiction, QED.22
So there’s an important disanalogy between recombination for relations and re-
combination for monadic properties. Any set allows more qualitative patterns of a
dyadic relation than it has members; but the same isn’t true for qualitative patterns
of monadic properties. So while qualitative recombination principles may remain
well-behaved for monadic properties, analogous principles for relations lead to com-
binatorial explosion.
It’s striking that the requirement of disjoint embeddings in P-Paste plays an essential
role in this impossibility result (unlike the P-Plenitude result in section 2). In partic-
ular, the argument that at W+ there are at least as many marbles as Ω-worlds (i.e.,
D ≥ Ω) requires that the “paste” world has at least one distinct marble represent-
ing each pattern. If the embedded structures are allowed to overlap, then this is
not guaranteed. In fact, we can show that if P-Paste is weakened to Overlapping P-
Paste, combinatorial explosion is once again averted. This is due to another striking
mathematical fact.
Theorem 3 If P is ﬁnite, then there is a countable P-structure that embeds every
countable P-structure.
Since the proof of this result is more involved, we defer it to appendix A. The proof
uses a construction from model theory called a Fraïssé Limit.23 In the special case of
a single dyadic relation, this “universal” structure is called the random graph, on
account of one of its striking properties (Erdős and Rényi 1963; Rado 1964). Let D
be a countable set. Suppose an angel visits each ordered pair of elements (d1, d2) in
D and ﬂips a fair coin: if it comes up heads, d1 zaps d2, and otherwise not. Once
every pair has been visited, we have a certain zapping-structure with domain D.
It turns out that with probability one, the resulting structure is isomorphic to the
random graph. (This property can also be used to provide an alternative existence
proof for the structure in question—using the fact that a set of measure one must
be non-empty!)
22Note that the proof of Theorem 2 using Burali-Forti’s Theorem shows something stronger: a
weaker principle than P-Pattern also conﬂicts with P-Paste. Namely:
Order Pattern At any world, for any marble structure S which is a well-ordering, some world real-
izes S.
The proof of Theorem 2 using Cantor’s Theorem also shows something stronger: not only is
IsoP D > D, but in fact IsoP D ≥  2D.23Thanks to Alex Kruckman on http://math.stackexchange.com for pointing us in the right
direction.
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Using Theorem 3, we can argue:
If P is ﬁnite, then P-Pattern and Overlapping P-Paste are consistent (together
with World Set, Marble Structure, and Possible Marble).
Once again, we can provide amodel by letting the worlds include one representative
from each isomorphism type of countable P-structures—thus satisfying P-Pattern.
These include a worldW+ that realizes the “universal” structure from Theorem 3,
which embeds every world—thus satisfying Overlapping P-Paste.
In fact, a stronger version of Theorem 3 also holds, which generalizes beyond the
ﬁnite case. (See appendix A.)
Theorem 4 If 𝜅 is an inaccessible cardinal and P < 𝜅, there is P-structure of size
𝜅 that embeds every P-structure of size at most 𝜅.
So, for an arbitrary set of relations P, given the existence of a sufﬁciently large in-
accessible cardinal, P-Pattern can be maintained consistently with Overlapping P-
Paste.
4 Pluralities of Worlds
So far our arguments have relied heavily on two set-theoretic background assump-
tions: World Set and Marble Set. Nolan (1996) and Sider (2009) have thought
that these were the key culprits that make trouble for recombination—and it’s true
that rejecting them does evade one kind of combinatorial argument (see also Pruss
2001). But as we’ll see in this section, the main impossibility result of section 3 does
not essentially turn on these set-theoretic assumptions.
Let’s begin by examining Daniel Nolan’s independent argument against the com-
bination of World Set and Marble Set. His basic observation (adapted to our termi-
nology) is that World Set and Marble Set are jointly inconsistent with this principle:
Sizes For any cardinal 𝜅, at some world there are at least 𝜅 marbles.
Here’s a version of the argument. Suppose Marble Set: so for each worldW, there
is a certain cardinal which at W is the number of marbles. Call any such cardinal
a “world cardinal”. Suppose World Set: then there is a set of all world cardinals.24
24By the axiom of Replacement.
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For any set of cardinals, there is a cardinal 𝜅 strictly greater than each of them.25
Then no cardinal greater than or equal to 𝜅 is itself a world cardinal—contradicting
Sizes, QED.26
Why might the combinatorialist accept Sizes? As Nolan presents things, Sizes fol-
lows from a combinatorial principle that Lewis entertained (without quite endors-
ing): “for any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number
of duplicates of all of those objects” (Nolan 1996, 239, our emphasis; paraphras-
ing Lewis 1986, 89). This leaves off Lewis’s caveat: “size and shape permitting”.
What Nolan recommends is that we don’t impose the caveat, and instead drop the
combination of World Set and Marble Set.
(There are two ways this could go. One way would be to keep Marble Set, but say
that for each cardinal, there is a world with that many marbles—and thus too many
worlds to form a set. The other way would be to say that there is at least one vast
world containing too many marbles to form a set—which all by itself would sufﬁce
to make Sizes true.)
An alternative way of motivating Sizes uses our ideology of structures, rather than
the Lewisian ideology of duplication. Sizes follows from this principle:
Copy For any cardinal number 𝜅 and for any world W, there is a world W+ that
disjointly embeds at least 𝜅 isomorphic copies of the structure realized byW.
Just as with Sizes, the Copy principle is ﬁne as long as we don’t try to maintain both
Marble Set and World Set.
25This follows from a combination of the axiom of Unions—getting us an upper bound for the
cardinals—and Power Set—getting us a cardinal strictly greater than that upper bound.
26This version of the argument has the advantage of not relying on either Lewisian modal realism
or Williamsonian Necessitism. (compare Uzquiano 2015.)
Nolan’s version of this argument was a bit simpler, but depends on more contentious background
assumptions. Suppose that there is a set of all possible marbles. Then this set has a certain cardinality,
and there is another cardinal 𝜅 which is greater yet. Then Sizes says there is some world in which
there are at least 𝜅 marbles—and so there are at least 𝜅 possible marbles, contradiction, QED. Note
that this version of the argument relies on this inference:
If at some worldW, there are at least 𝜅 marbles, then there are at least 𝜅 possible marbles.
This inference is unproblematic in the Lewisian framework in which Nolan is working. It is similarly
unproblematic in the Necessitist framework defended by Timothy Williamson, according to which,
if there could have been at least 𝜅 marbles, then there are at least 𝜅 things which could have been
marbles (see Sider 2009). But the relevant inference is rejected by Contingentists, who hold that it is
contingent which things are anything at all. The version of the argument we presented doesn’t rely
on this contentious inference.
(It does still rely on a restricted and less contentious Necessitist assumption: namely, that it is not
contingent what cardinals there are.)
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So giving up one or both of these set assumptions—World Set and Marble Set—
is a perfectly good way of escaping Nolan’s problem of Sizes. But the problem
of recombinable relations we presented in the previous section is not like that: as
we’ll now show, it does not rely in any essential way on either of these set-theoretic
assumptions. We can restate a generalized version of the argument using plural
quantiﬁcation.27
Our formulations of P-Paste and P-Pattern both involved structures whose domains
and extensions were sets. But it’s natural to extend the underlying idea to versions
which—in the absence of World Set and Marble Set—are stronger. Consider a
dyadic relation of zapping. A standard structure for zapping speciﬁes a set of or-
dered pairs as its extension. If there is no set of all marbles, then there are ways
of distributing zapping over pairs of marbles where those pairs are too numerous
to form a set—and thus they don’t comprise a zapping-extension in any structure,
in the standard sense we presented in section 2. But we can still naturally extend
the idea of a zapping-pattern to this case, by replacing singular quantiﬁcation over
structures with plural quantiﬁcation over ordered pairs. And we can show that, in
a naturally extended sense, it’s still true that there are strictly more isomorphically
distinct patterns of pairs of marbles than there are marbles.
The rest of this section will provide more detail about how this works. What we
need to do is translate standard structure-theoretic talk into plural language. This
requires some care, but it is essentially straightforward.
(In what follows, we’ll use the plural quantiﬁcational expression “there are zero or
more”, rather than the alternative “there are one or more”. Nothing essentially
turns on this choice, but it makes certain results easier to state. Apparent singular
quantiﬁcation over “pluralities” is just a heuristic shorthand for more serious plural
talk.)
A structure, as we deﬁned it before—or to be more explicit in what follows, a set
structure—was deﬁned as a pair of a certain set—the domain—and an extension
function—a function from relations to sets of n-tuples. Instead of quantifying over
these set-theoretic objects, we can instead quantify plurally over the things in the
domain and the tuples in the extensions, directly. Where before we said “there is a
structure S such that …”, instead we can say “there are some things, the S-domain-
things, and there are some tuples, the S-extension-tuples, such that …”. For a general
signature, we can think of a “plural structure” as an indexed family of pluralities: a
plurality for the domain, and a plurality of n-tuples for each n-place relation.
27We use standard plural logic (with full impredicative comprehension). (See e.g. Linnebo 2014.)
We also assume that pluralities of abstracta are ﬁxed, in this sense: if each of the X’s is a pure set or a
possible world, then x is one of the X’s iff at every world x is one of the X’s.
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While sets of sets are unproblematic, orthodox plural logic does not provide us with
the resources to straightforwardly quantify over “pluralities of pluralities”. But there
is a coding trick that lets us get around this obstacle in certain cases.28 Suppose that
for each i among the I’s, there are certain things, the Xi’s: then we can think of this
as a family of pluralities indexed by the I’s. (This is also called a class-valued function from
the I’s.) We can encode an indexed family of pluralities like this using a plurality of
pairs. In the case at hand, for each n-place relation F (in P) we want to represent
a “plural extension” for F, which consists of certain n-tuples, the SF’s. We can do
this using a plurality of ordered pairs, the S’s, such that each of the S’s is an ordered
pair of some n-place relation F, and some n-tuple. Then the SF’s are those n-tuples
(d1,…, dn) such that (F, (d1,…, dn)) is one of the S’s.
We also want to represent a domain: we can do this by picking some canonical
object Dom which is not a relation (for example, the word “domain” or the number
0), and include among the S’s some ordered pairs whose ﬁrst element isDom. Then
the S-domain consists of those things d such that (Dom, d) is one of the S’s.
In general, we’ll say the X’s code a family of pluralities indexed by the I’s iff
the X’s are ordered pairs each of which has one of the I’s as its ﬁrst element. Then
for any i among the I’s, we can let the Xi’s be those things x such that (i, x) is one of
the X’s. So, in particular, the S’s code a plural P-structure iff they code a family
of pluralities indexed by the relations in P together withDom, where for each n-adic
relation F in P, each of the SF’s is an n-tuple of things among the SDom’s. The SDom’s
are the S-domain, and the SF’s are the S-extension of F.
In what follows, it will sometimes be convenient to speak singularly, saying “there
is a plural P-structure S such that …”. But it’s important to bear in mind that, like
talk of “pluralities” or “families”, this is intended to be cashed out plurally, not as
singular quantiﬁcation over any kind of object which is itself a plural structure.
We can similarly extend other structure-theoretic notions to the plural case, such as
isomorphism and disjoint embedding. For instance, if S and S′ are plural structures,
we’ll say the X’s code an isomorphism from S to S′ iff each of the X’s is an
ordered pair (d, d′) where d is in the S-domain and d′ is in the S′-domain, and these
pairs satisfy suitable conditions. The details are straightforward, but tedious, so we’ll
relegate them to appendix B.
In order to compare structures across worlds, it will again be helpful to appeal to
“ﬁxed” structures. Once again, we will deploy a ﬁxed universe of pure sets for this
purpose. Let a pure plural structure be a plural structure each of whose domain-
28This coding trick, from Paul Bernays, takes advantage of the Curry correspondence between
I → 2X and 2I×X. (See Uzquiano 2015, 9)
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things is a pure set. Then we can deﬁne realization as before. At any world, the
real marble plural structure S has as its domain all of the marbles, and for each
relation F in P, the S-extension of F consists of just the n-tuples of marbles that stand
in F. Then ifW is a world, and the S’s code a plural P-structure:
W realizes S iff, for some pure plural P-structure S′ which is isomorphic to
S, atW, the real marble plural structure is isomorphic to S′.
Now we can state our generalized pattern principle:
Plural Pattern At any world, for any S’s that code a plural structure whose do-
main consists of the marbles, some world realizes S.
We can also straightforwardly extend the deﬁnition of disjoint embedding (with re-
spect to a signature P) to pluralities of worlds. (Again, this is in appendix B.) As in
the set case, the deﬁnition has the following important consequence. Let amarble-
world be a world at which there is at least one marble.
Enough Marbles If each of theW’s is a marble-world, andW+ disjointly embeds
theW’s, then atW+ there are at least as many marbles as theW’s.
(As is standard, plural cardinal comparisons can be spelled out in terms of pluralities
of pairs: at W+ there are some ordered pairs that code a one-to-one function from
the marbles to theW-worlds.)
Now we can state a plural generalization of our Paste principle:
Disjoint Plural Paste For any worlds, theW’s, there is some worldW+ such that
W+ disjointly embeds theW’s.
The key point is that these plurally generalized recombination principles face ex-
actly the same difﬁculty as the set-theoretic versions. We can now adapt our impos-
sibility result from section 3 to show:
Global Choice, Possible Marble, Plural Pattern and Disjoint Plural Paste are
not all true.
The main idea of the argument is the same as before. Consider a single dyadic
relation of zapping. Given Disjoint Plural Paste, there is a world W+ that disjointly
embeds all of the marble-worlds—those worlds at which there is at least one marble.
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By Enough Marbles, at W+ there are at least as many marbles as marble-worlds.
Possible Marble ensures that there is at least one marble-world, and so atW+ there
is at least one marble. Plural Pattern says that atW+, for any pairs of marbles, some
world realizes that zapping pattern—and in particular, this is a marble-world. So
there is a distinct marble-world for each isomorphically distinct way of choosing
pairs of marbles.29 Thus at W+ there are at least as many marbles as patterns of pairs
of marbles. But as we’ll show, this is impossible.
What remains to be shown is that there are strictly more patterns of pairs of marbles
than there are marbles. To show this, we can use a plural generalization of Cantor’s
Theorem (Bernays 1942). This theorem formalizes the intuitive idea that there are
strictly more pluralities of marbles than there are marbles. We can state this using
the same trick for coding indexed families of pluralities. The idea is that no family of
pluralities indexed by D’s can include every plurality of D’s.
Cantor–Bernays Theorem Let the X’s code a family of pluralities indexed by
the D’s. Then there are (zero or more) D’s which are not the Xd’s for any d.
Bernays’ proof is an easy application of the usual Cantor–Russell trick: let the R’s be
the (zero or more) things d such that d is not among the Xd’s. Suppose for reductio
that for some d, the Xd’s are the R’s. Then it follows that d is not among the R’s.
That is, d is among the Xd’s, and so by construction d is one of the R’s, which is a
contradiction.
We can extend Bernays’ result about pluralities to an analogous result about plural
structures. This formalizes the intuitive thought that there are more isomorphism-
types for a relation on marbles than there are marbles.
Theorem 5 Let P be a polyadic signature. Let the S’s code a family of plural P-
structures indexed by the D’s. (That is, for each d among the D’s, the Sd’s
code some plural structure.) If the D’s can be well-ordered, then some plural
structure on the D’s is not isomorphic to Sd for any d.
The proof is a straightforward “pluralization” of the proof of Theorem 2 we gave
in section 3. For details, see appendix B.30
29This step relies on the plural analogue of Structural Possibilities, which can be shown in the same
way as the set version from our background assumptions about the ﬁxity of pluralities of pure sets.
30Here is a technicality. (Thanks to Daniel Nolan for very helpful discussion.) To derive our im-
possiblity result from Theorem 5, we need the further claim that, in any possible world, the marbles
can be well-ordered. While the fact that any set can be well-ordered is equivalent to the set-theoretic
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5 Unrestricted Patterns
So far we’ve been exploring the difﬁculties that arise for the combination of two
different combinatorial ideas. First, the “pattern” idea,
Any pattern of instantiation of any fundamental properties and relations is
metaphysically possible.
Second, the “cut and paste” idea,
For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number
of duplicates of all of those objects.
Let’s now consider the prospects for the “pattern” idea taken on its own. This turns
out to be very powerful.
Let P be some arbitrary polyadic signature: some set of properties and relations,
including at least one relation which is not a monadic property. In this section
“structures” are to be understood as structures with signature P.
We have considered two ways of spelling out the “pattern” slogan. First:
Marble Set Pattern At any world, for any (set) structure S whose domain is the
set of marbles, some world realizes S.
(In section 2 we called this “P-Pattern”.) The second way (which in section 4 we
called Plural Pattern) generalizes from set structures, which are limited in size to
what can be contained in a single set, to a pluralized version that is not so limited.
axiom of Choice, it turns out that the plural generalizations of these principles—Global Well-Ordering
and Global Choice—are not equivalent: in fact, there are models of Global Choice without Global
Well-Ordering (Howard, Rubin, and Rubin 1978).
Still, Global Choice does imply that any plurality of pure sets can be well-ordered (see e.g. Linnebo
2010, 161–62). It follows that, if there are nomoreX’s than pure sets, then theX’s can be well-ordered.
Furthermore, recall that we deﬁned “realizes” in terms of isomorphism with a pure plural structure.
It follows from this deﬁnition that any plural structure with a domain outnumbering the pure sets is
unrealizable. So in fact, Plural Pattern implies that there are no more marbles than pure sets. (See
our discussion of Limitation of Size in section 5).) Given this, Global Choice implies that the marbles
can be well-ordered.
More generally, Howard, Rubin, and Rubin (1978) show that many different formulations of
Choice-like principles whose set-theoretic formulations are equivalent can subtly come apart in the
context of plural logic. Fortunately for us, these subtleties shouldn’t matter so long as there are no
more marbles than pure sets: any standard plural formulation of Choice should do as far as Theorem
5 is concerned.
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Marble Plural Pattern At any world, for any plural structure S whose domain
consists of all marbles, some world realizes S.
(Recall that apparently singular quantiﬁcation over plural structures, like
“plurality”-talk, is cloaked plural quantiﬁcation: the variable S here is really a
plural variable.)
Each of these Pattern principles has consequences that go beyond those of Lewis’s
“cut and paste” duplication principle. The duplication principle does not guarantee
that, if there could be a red marble and a square marble, then there could be a red
squaremarble; nor does it guarantee that if there could be a zapping pair of marbles,
then there could be marbles that don’t zap one another, or that any marble could
zap itself (see also Wilson 2015, 148). By contrast, Marble Set Pattern and Marble
Plural Pattern each imply all of these conditionals (assuming the signature P includes
redness, squareness, and zapping).
That said, the duplication principle has consequences that the Pattern principles by
themselves do not secure: if there could be one marble, then there could be three,
or inﬁnitely many, or indeed 𝜅-many for any cardinal 𝜅. That is, if there could be
at least one marble, then this principle we discussed in section 4 follows:
Sizes For any cardinal 𝜅, at some world there are at least 𝜅 marbles.
But neither Marble Set Pattern nor Marble Plural Pattern implies Sizes. In fact,
for any non-zero cardinal 𝜅, both Marble Pattern principles are consistent with
there being at most 𝜅 marbles at any world. Unlike “cut and paste”, these Pattern
principles (on their own) don’t give us any way of getting larger worlds from smaller
ones. This suggests that they don’t entirely do justice to the picture that motivated
the combinatorial slogan about “any pattern of instantiation”.
We can do better by slightly modifying the Pattern principles. Notice that in the
statement of these principles, marbles are really playing two distinct roles. One role
is as possible “realizers” of structures. The other role is as “generators” of structures.
The pattern principle roughly says: any abstract structure could be concretely real-
ized. The abstract structures are generated using a domain of objects, and a set of
properties and relations. But there is no obstacle to using, say, numbers to generate
an abstract structure that can be concretely realized by, say, people. For example, an
abstract structure for the loving relation with a domain of numbers just amounts to
a set of ordered pairs of numbers. Notice that the existence of such structures has
nothing to do with whether numbers are capable of love. For some people to realize
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this structure just requires that the pattern of loving among them be isomorphic to
those pairs of numbers.
The key point is that even if we are using marbles as “realizers”, this doesn’t pre-
clude us from using different things as “generators”. So we might choose generators
that exist in great multitudes—like numbers. If every structure generated by such a
multitude can be realized by marbles, then in particular, there can be a multitude
of marbles. This motivates strengthening Marble Set Pattern as follows:
Unrestricted Set Pattern At any world, for every (set) structure S, some world
realizes S.
(Compare Bricker’s principle (P1) 1991, 612.) This formulation simply drops the
words “whose domain is the set of marbles” fromMarble Set Pattern. The principle
says that any structure with any set-sized domain will do. Note that Sizes immedi-
ately follows from this.
Recall that in section 2 we deﬁned “realizes” in terms of pure structures (to allow
cross-world comparisons), and we are assuming that it is not contingent what pure
sets there are. This means we can make two simpliﬁcations to Unrestricted Set
Pattern without losing any power: we can restrict the structure-quantiﬁer to pure
structures, and we can drop the words “at any world”. Given our background as-
sumptions, this version is equivalent:
Pure Set Pattern For every pure set structure S, some world realizes S.
There are as many distinct isomorphism types of pure set structures as pure sets.31
Thus Pure Set Pattern implies that there are at least as many worlds as pure sets,
and thus the worlds are themselves too plentiful to form a set (by the axiom of Re-
placement). So Unrestricted Set Pattern is inconsistent with the principle World
Set.
Even so, Unrestricted Set Pattern is consistent taken on its own. It is also consistent
together with the principle Marble Set (which, recall, says that at each world there
is a set of all marbles). One way this could be is if for each pure set structure S there
is a possible world WS that realizes S, and these are all of the possible worlds. This
would clearly satisfy Pure Set Pattern, and thus Unrestricted Set Pattern.
In previous sections we’ve considered four different “paste”-style principles. (In sec-
tion 2 we used the names “P-Paste” and “Overlapping P-Paste” for the ﬁrst two.)
31Indeed, there is an isomorphically distinct structure for each ordinal, and there are as many
ordinals as sets.
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Disjoint Set Paste For any set of worlds Ω, some world realizes a set structure
that disjointly embeds set structures realized by each world in Ω.
Overlapping Set Paste For any set of worlds Ω, some world realizes a set struc-
ture that embeds a set structure realized by each world in Ω.
Disjoint Plural Paste For any worlds, theW’s, some world realizes a plural struc-
ture that disjointly embeds a family of plural structures realized by theW’s.
Overlapping Plural Paste For any worlds, theW’s, some world realizes a plural
structure that embeds a plural structure realized by eachW-world.
What is the upshot of Unrestricted Set Pattern for these various principles?
First, suppose Marble Set is true. Unrestricted Set Pattern and Marble Set to-
gether imply that both Plural Paste principles are false: no single set of marbles
is big enough to embed every set-sized marble pattern. But Unrestricted Set Pat-
tern and Marble Set also jointly imply that both Set Paste principles are true: each
set of worlds can be disjointly embedded in some world. (This is because any set of
set-structures has a disjoint sum: see appendix A.)
Things are a bit messier if Marble Set is false. In that case, some world doesn’t
realize any set structure at all—it has too many marbles for that. So both Set Paste
principles come out trivially false. Also, without Marble Set, Unrestricted Set Pat-
tern does not imply either of the Plural Paste principles, nor their negations.
Let’s now consider the stronger plural version of this unrestricted pattern principle:
Unrestricted Plural Pattern (UPP) At any world, for any plural structure S,
some world realizes S.
Again, because we deﬁned “realizes” in terms of non-contingent pure plural struc-
tures, UPP implies that every plural structure is isomorphic to some pure plural struc-
ture. In particular, UPP implies
Limitation of Size At any world, there are no more things than pure sets.
Against our set-theoretic background, this principle is equivalent to (the necessi-
tation of) an inﬂuential proposal from Von Neumann: some things form a set iff
they are not in one-to-one correspondence with everything.32 (For discussion of
32Note also that Limitation of Size implies Global Choice andGlobalWell-Ordering. (Limitation of
Size puts everything in one-to-one correspondence with the ordinals; we can use this correspondence
to deﬁne a global choice function.) In the presence of the Urelement Set axiom (that there is a set of
all non-sets) the converse implication from Global Choice to Limitation of Size holds as well (Linnebo
2010, 151–52 and 161–162). But since we are not assuming Urelement Set, in our context Limitation
of Size is in fact a stronger claim than Global Choice.
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this principle’s merits, see Hawthorne and Uzquiano 2011, sec. 6.3.)
In fact, UPP is equivalent to the conjunction of Limitation of Size with a restricted
pattern principle (given our background assumption that it’s not contingent what
pure sets there are):
Pure Plural Pattern For any pure plural structure S, some world realizes S.
We noted that Unrestricted Set Pattern is inconsistent with World Set. Unrestricted
Plural Pattern has more radical consequences yet for worlds: indeed, on one natural
way of understanding it, the principle is inconsistent. Theorem 5 tells us that there
are strictly more isomorphically distinct plural structures than things. But if worlds
are things, then since UPP requires that there are as many worlds as isomorphism
types, this would imply that there are strictly more worlds than worlds, which can-
not be. The issue here arises from the fact that UPP lets us use any sort of thing
as generators—and so in particular, if worlds are things, then they can generate
patterns themselves.
There are two natural ways to respond to this. One is to back off from the fully
unrestricted principle, and stick to a restricted principle that doesn’t allow worlds as
pattern-generators: for example, Pure Plural Pattern is a natural fall-back principle.
As we noted, if Limitation of Size holds, then Pure Plural Pattern is just as strong as
Unrestricted Plural Pattern. But (putting this another way) if worlds are things, then
in fact Pure Plural Pattern implies that Limitation of Size is false: there are strictly
more worlds than pure sets.
The second response is to understand quantiﬁcation over worlds as a façon de parler—
just as we have done with quantiﬁcation over pluralities or plural structures or families or
isomorphism types. The idea is that there aren’t any such objects as worlds; but rather,
this is a convenient shorthand for some other more perspicuous idiom. If our goal is
just to restate UPP, then this could be the idiom of familiar modal operators (“boxes
and diamonds”):
Necessarily, for any plural structure S, possibly S is realized.
If worlds aren’t things, then they can’t be used as generators for structures, and so
collapse is averted.
Paraphrases using modal operators won’t work for every use of world-quantiﬁers
in this paper—in particular, plural quantiﬁcation over worlds and cardinal com-
parisons pose special challenges. For a more general solution, one might invoke
some higher-order idiom, such as quantiﬁcation in sentence or operator position
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(see Fine 1977, 137ff.). For consistency, we’ll understand the principles we discuss
to be ofﬁcially expressed in a sorted language that distinguishes world-quantiﬁers
from ﬁrst-order object-quantiﬁers.33
Similar issues may arise not just for worlds, but also for other plenitudinous domains,
such as propositions, properties, events, facts, etc. (We’ll return to this shortly.)
Like Unrestricted Set Pattern, Unrestricted Plural Pattern implies Sizes: for each
cardinal, some world has at least that many marbles. But the plural principle also
generates even larger patterns yet, whose domain-things are more numerous than
any cardinal. For instance, since there are plural patterns whose domains include all
the pure sets, UPP implies that there could be as many marbles as there are pure
sets. Thus UPP is inconsistent with Marble Set.34
Even though UPP is inconsistent with World Set, and also inconsistent with Marble
Set, it’s still consistent taken on its own (given the caveat about world-quantiﬁers).
One way this could be is if there is one possible world realizing each pure plural
structure, and no other possible worlds. This guarantees Pure Plural Pattern. If
furthermore at each world there are no objects besides marbles and sets, then since
at each world there are no more marbles than pure sets, Limitation of Size follows.35
Finally, as we noted, Limitation of Size and Pure Plural Pattern together imply Un-
restricted Plural Pattern.
Now let’s examine how this plural-structure-based way of articulating recombina-
tion interacts with the “cut and paste” idea. It follows directly from the Cantorian
argument we presented in section 4 that Unrestricted Plural Pattern is inconsis-
tent with Disjoint Plural Paste. But all three of the other Paste principles we’ve
considered—Overlapping Plural Paste, Disjoint Set Paste, and Overlapping Set
Paste—not only are consistent with UPP, but in fact follow from UPP.
Disjoint Set Paste and Overlapping Set Paste each follow from this stronger Paste
principle:
33We’ll also need plural quantiﬁers for both individual and world types, as well as a sort of quan-
tiﬁer for “cross-categorial ordered pairs”, where one element is of world-type and the other is of
individual-type—or at least some surrogate for these quantiﬁers, such as even-higher-order relational
quantiﬁcation. We’ll suppress these technical details to keep things readable.
34This depends on our background assumption that there couldn’t be more pure sets than there
are.
Note also that if we assume that (at every world) no marble is a set, then UPP is inconsistent with
the necessity of the Urelement Set axiom. This may also put further pressure on Limitation of Size:
for instance, if at each world distinct pluralities of marbles have distinct fusions, then there could be
strictly more fusions of marbles than pure sets (see Hawthorne and Uzquiano 2011).
35This relies on Global Choice (see Uzquiano 2015, proposition 2 in the appendix).
29
Disjoint Paste for Not Very Many Worlds For any worlds the W’s, if the W’s
are not more numerous than the things, there is someworldW+ that disjointly
embeds theW’s.
By “Many” we will mean as numerous as the things, and by “VeryMany” we will
mean even more numerous than the things. (Remember, “worlds” are not things
themselves—and indeed, taken all together they aremore numerous than the things.
Limitation of Size says that there are Many pure sets—but not VeryMany.) The ba-
sic reason why Disjoint Paste for Not Very Many Worlds follows from Unrestricted
Plural Pattern is that—putting things a bit roughly—any not-Very-Many plurali-
ties of things have a disjoint union, which is another plurality of things. Thus any
not-Very-Many pure plural structures can be disjointly embedded in another pure
plural structure (their “disjoint sum”), which sufﬁces for Disjoint Set Paste—given
Limitation of Size, since in that case every world realizes some pure plural structure.
The derivation of Overlapping Plural Paste is less obvious: this relies on a plural
generalization of Theorem 4 based on Fraïssé’s construction. This generalization
shows the following remarkable fact (see appendix B):
Theorem 6 Given Global Choice, there is a pure plural structure that embeds
every pure plural structure.
Again, since Limitation of Size implies that every world realizes a pure plural struc-
ture, this sufﬁces for Overlapping Paste. The plural structure guaranteed by The-
orem 6—we’ll call it the universal plural structure—is a kind of mathematical
pluriverse: an abstract universe that, in a sense, includes every abstract universe.
If we lived in a world that realized this structure, then something very much like
Lewisian modal realism would be true.36
Note also that the universal plural structure contains many copies of itself—in fact,
as many copies as things.37 So we also have two strong duplication-style principles
that follow from Unrestricted Plural Pattern with Limitation of Size. Let a plural
part of a world be a plural-substructure of the plural structure realized by that
world, and say that a world embeds a plural structure S iff it realizes a structure that
36Except Lewis holds that the concrete universes are isolated, in the sense that no fundamental
relations—or at least no “spatio-temporally analogous” fundamental relations—link non-world-mates
(1986, 75–78). In contrast, the universal plural structure is not divisible into relationally isolated
substructures.
37The basic reason for this is that “Many times Many equals Many”: we can divide up a plurality
of Many things into Many disjoint subpluralities of Many things. Then we can paint the universal
plural structure onto each of these subpluralities.
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embeds S. (Again quantiﬁcation over “plural parts” is really shorthand for a plural
quantiﬁcation.)
Overlapping Plural Copy For any plural parts of any worlds, some world em-
beds Many isomorphic copies of each of them.
Disjoint Plural Copy for Not Very Many Parts For any not-Very-Many plu-
ral parts of any worlds, someworld disjointly embedsMany isomorphic copies
of each of them.
These principles are very similar in spirit to Lewis’s duplication principle—but these
are not extra postulates, but rather consequences of Unrestricted Plural Pattern.
And unlike Lewis’s version, there is no pressure to tack on any extra caveats like
“size and shape permitting” to this package.
Unrestricted Plural Pattern looks to us like a promising articulation of the com-
binatorialist idea—“there are no gaps in logical space”. But we should note that
this version wasn’t available to Lewis: it’s integral to his vision that worlds are gen-
uine concrete individual objects, and as we noted earlier, this conception of possible
worlds is incompatible with UPP—since then worlds themselves would be genera-
tors of patterns. Putting this point another way, we have a vindication of Forrest and
Armstrong’s original idea, understood broadly: a combinatorial argument against
Lewis’s theory of possible worlds.
Unrestricted Plural Pattern also makes trouble for other metaphysical views besides
Lewis’s. Notice ﬁrst that the argument against Lewisian modal realism doesn’t es-
sentially rely on construing worlds as concrete: it also applies to any view according
to which worlds are particular sets, or sui generis abstract objects (whether these are
structured “states of affairs” or unstructured simples), as long as they are something.
More generally, UPP conﬂicts with any view according to which there are at least as
many objects as marble-worlds. For example, you might think that for each world
W there is a certain necessarily existing state of affairs which obtains just atW. Any
view like this is incompatible with UPP.
Here’s another example. Some philosophers, having become convinced that stat-
ues and lumps of clay can be distinct while entirely coinciding, go on to embrace
“bazillion-thingism”: in addition to familiar objects like statues and lumps of clay,
there are many less familiar coincidents. Some are more modally fragile—like
Tate-Museum-statues that are destroyed by transport—and some are more modally
robust—like clay-aggregates that can survive utter dispersal (Bennett 2004, 356; see
also Yablo 1987; Hawthorne 2006; Leslie 2011). One ambitious version of bazillion-
thingism says that each marble M coincides with a distinct thing for each way of
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choosing either a marble or nothing from every non-actual possible world. In that
case there are even more objects coinciding with M than there are marble-worlds.
So this kind of plenitudinous ontology is also at odds with Unrestricted Plural Pat-
tern. Of course, our point here is just to point out the tension between Unrestricted
Plural Pattern and this kind of plenitude—we take no stand on which way it should
be resolved.
We’ve been examining combinatorial principles based on the model-theoretic ideas
of structures and isomorphisms. It’s worth taking a moment to compare this to a
different approach. Raul Saucedo (2011, 242–3) makes the following proposal for
explicating the idea that every pattern of certain properties and relations is meta-
physically possible:
Suppose that L is a ﬁrst-order language with standard logical vocabulary
(the truth-functional connectives, ﬁrst-order variables and quantiﬁers, and
the identity symbol), whose non-logical vocabulary consists of only a stock of
predicates. Let’s assume that every n-place predicate of L expresses exactly
one n-place property or relation, and that every n-place property or relation
is expressed by exactly one n-place predicate of L. Then we may formulate
recombination principles for properties and relations as follows:
Any such-and-such sentence of L is true at some metaphysically possible
world.
Saucedo discusses several ways of ﬁlling in “such-and-such”; here is one:
Any sentence of L that has a model is true at some metaphysically possible
world. (p. 245)
(This is a bit stronger than his favored version of the principle, which adds in some
extra qualiﬁcations. Some of these can be handled simply by restricting which prop-
erties and relations are expressed by predicates in L.)
As Saucedo acknowledges (his footnote 14), an ordinary ﬁrst-order language is ex-
pressively limited. So this recombination principle is accordingly weaker than one
might wish. For example, standard metalogical results about ﬁrst-order logic show
that Saucedo’s principle is compatible with there being no world where a certain
binary relation expressed by a predicate in L has the structure of an 𝜔-sequence.
Likewise, it is compatible with every property expressed by a predicate in L having
just countably many instances at every world. So this principle does not guarantee
the metaphysical possibility of many perfectly good inﬁnite patterns.
One might try to overcome these limitations (as Saucedo also suggests) by switching
to a more expressive language (see also Dorr and Hawthorne 2013, 14ff.). In fact, in
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order to get a principle as strong as Unrestricted Set Pattern, one would have to go
all the way up to a language which includes Many sentences—no ordinary set-sized
language will do. To get a principle with the strength of Unrestricted Plural Pattern
we have to go further yet—for instance, by considering the Very Many pluralities of
sentences in such a large language.38
But these complications are avoidable. These are efforts to ﬁnd languages which are
expressive enough to characterize every structure. But why not simply talk about
structures themselves directly, as we have done, without this detour through trans-
ﬁnite syntax? The structures were in the background of the sentential approach
anyway, since having a model (that is, being true in some structure) was our test all
along for which sentences are logically consistent, and thus, according to the senten-
tial recombination principle, true at some world. Furthermore, as we hope we’ve
demonstrated throughout this paper, examining structures directly can provide us
with illuminating insights into the space of possible patterns.
A Set Structures
In this appendix we’ll present proofs of three key model-theoretic facts we used in
this paper. (1) For any set of monadic properties, there is a structure that disjointly
embeds every structure of its size. (2) For polyadic relations, there is no non-empty
structure that disjointly embeds every structure of its size. (3) In either case, there is
a structure that embeds each structure of its size, if we don’t require disjointness.
We begin with some standard deﬁnitions, for reference.
Deﬁnition 1 (a) A signature is a set P each element of which has some adicity
(which is some positive natural number). As in the main text, we’ll call
the elements of P relations. A signature P is monadic iff each of its
members has adicity one. Otherwise P is polyadic.
(b) A (set) P-structure is a pair of a set D, the domain, and a function
that takes each n-place relation F in P to a subset of Dn, the extension
of F.
(c) An element of a structure S is an element of its domain. The size of S
(written |S|) is the number of its elements.
(d) Let S1 and S2 be P-structures with domains D1 and D2, respectively. An
embedding of S1 in S2 is a one-to-one function f ∶ D1 → D2 such that,
38Unrestricted Plural Pattern is thus plausibly a counterexample to Dorr and Hawthorne’s conjec-
ture in Dorr and Hawthorne (2013 footnote 23).
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for each n-place F in P, and for each n-tuple of elements (d1,…,  dn) in
D, (d1,…,  dn) is in the S1-extension of F iff (fd1,…,  fdn) is in the S2-
extension of F. The structure S2 embeds S1 iff there is an embedding
of S1 in S2.
(e) An isomorphism is an embedding which is also an onto function. S1
and S2 are isomorphic (S1 ≅ S2) iff there is an isomorphism from S1
to S2.
(f) S1 is a substructure of S2 (written S1 ⊆ S2) iff the domain of S1 is a
subset of the domain of S2, and the function the takes each element of
S1 to itself is an embedding.
Note that an embedding of S1 in S2 is an isomorphism between S1 and some sub-
structure of S2. If S2 embeds S1 then clearly |S2| ≥ |S1|.
Deﬁnition 2 S+ disjointly embeds a family of structures Si indexed by I iff for
each i ∈ I there is an embedding fi ∶ Si → S+ such that for i ≠ j, the ranges
of fi and fj have no elements in common.
Some of our arguments will use the sum of some structures Si, which “glues together”
a family of structures without overlap. This is the minimal structure that disjointly
embeds the family Si. The domain of the sum-structure has as its domain a disjoint
union of the original domains, and its extension for each relation F is the corre-
sponding disjoint union of the Si-extensions for F.
Deﬁnition 3 Let Si be a family of P-structures, for i ∈ I. The disjoint sum
∐i∈I Si is the P-structure whose domain consists of all ordered pairs (i, d) for
i ∈ I and d in Si, and whose extension for each n-place F in P is the set of all
n-tuples ((i, d1),…, (i, dn)) for i ∈ I and (d1,…, dn) in the Si-extension of F.
The following facts about sums are clear from the deﬁnitions.
Lemma 1 A structure S+ disjointly embeds the family of structures Si iff S+ embeds
their disjoint sum∐i Si.
Lemma 2 Let S+ = ∐i∈I Si and let 𝜆 = |I|. If Si is non-empty for each i ∈ I, then
|S+| ≥ 𝜆. If |Si| ≤ 𝜅 for each i ∈ I, then |S+| ≤ 𝜅 × 𝜆.
Deﬁnition 4 (a) A P-structure U isweakly universal iff U embeds each struc-
ture which is no larger than U.
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(b) A P-structure U is strongly universal iff U disjointly embeds a repre-
sentative of each isomorphism type of structure no larger than U.
Clearly any strongly universal structure is also weakly universal.
Theorem 1 If P is a monadic signature, there exists a strongly universal
P-structure.
Proof. When P consists of just monadic properties, we can fully describe a P-structure
by specifying how many elements it has with each proﬁle of P-properties. (In the
monadic case, we don’t have to keep track of any connections between different
elements.) If S is a P-structure, then for each d in S, let the individual proﬁle of
d be the set of F ∈ P such that d is in the extension of F. Let the global proﬁle
for S be the function that takes each subset Q ⊆ P to the number of elements in
S which have individual proﬁle Q: this is some cardinal which is at most |S|. Two
P-structures are isomorphic iff they have the same global proﬁle.
We can choose a cardinal 𝜅 such that there are no more than 𝜅 different global
proﬁles corresponding to structures of size at most 𝜅. In particular, let 𝜋 = |P|, and
let 𝜅 be an inﬁnite cardinal such that
𝜅2𝜋 = 𝜅
(If 𝜋 is ﬁnite, this equation holds for any inﬁnite 𝜅. More generally, it holds for any
inaccessible 𝜅 > 𝜋. It also holds for 𝜅 = 2𝜇 for any inﬁnite 𝜇 ≥ 2𝜋 .) Let Φ be
the set of all functions from subsets of P to cardinals which are at most 𝜅. Then Φ
clearly has at most 𝜅2𝜋 = 𝜅 elements.
For each function f ∈ Φ, we can choose a representative structure Sf whose global
proﬁle is f. So every structure of size at most 𝜅 is isomorphic to Sf for some f ∈ Φ.
Finally, let U be the sum∐f∈Φ Sf. Since Φ has cardinality 𝜅 and |Sf| ≤  𝜅 for each
f ∈ Φ, by Lemma 2, |U| ≤  𝜅 × 𝜅 = 𝜅. (In fact, |U| = 𝜅.) So U disjointly embeds a
representative of each isomorphism type of structure no larger thanU, which means
that U is strongly universal.  
Now suppose P is a polyadic signature. Let 𝜅 > 0, and let Si for i ∈ I be a family of
structures including one representative of each isomorphism type of structure with
size 𝜅. Let 𝜆 = |I|. In section 3 we proved Theorem 2: 𝜆 > 𝜅. Moreover, if U is a
structure that disjointly embeds the family Si, by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
|U| ≥ |  ∐i
Si|   ≥ 𝜆 > 𝜅
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Corollary 1 If P is a polyadic signature, there is no non-empty strongly universal
P-structure.
Next we’ll prove the main “possibility” result from section 3: there are structures
that embed every structure that is not too big. First, recall the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 5 (a) 𝜅 is regular iff any union of strictly fewer than 𝜅 sets, each
of which has strictly fewer than 𝜅 elements, has strictly fewer than 𝜅
elements.
(b) 𝜅 is inaccessible iff 𝜅 is regular and for any 𝜆 < 𝜅, we also have
2𝜆 < 𝜅.
Theorem 4 Let P be any signature. If 𝜅 is an inaccessible cardinal strictly larger
than P, then there is a weakly universal P-structure of size 𝜅.
This fact follows from a theorem by Roland Fraïssé. Since the existing presentations
of the proof we’ve been able to ﬁnd are either insufﬁciently general for our purposes
(for the countable case see Hodges 1997, 158–64) or else use forbiddingly high-
powered technical machinery (e.g. Caramello 2008, and references therein), we’ll
sketch a proof here. This proof sketch will also help us generalize to the plural case.
It’s worth noting that the theorem does not rely on any large cardinal axioms; but
if large enough inaccessibles do not exist, then it is vacuous. To use Theorem 4 to
deduce that there exist weakly universal P-structures for each signature P requires
the additional premise that every cardinal is exceeded by some inaccessible. This is
independent of ZFCU.
In what follows, let P be any signature, and let 𝜅 > |P| be an inaccessible cardinal.
A small structure is a P-structure with size strictly less than 𝜅.
The proof of Theorem 4 turns on a certain homogeneity property. Our strategy will
be to prove two main lemmas:
1. If U is homogeneous, then U embeds every structure of size at most 𝜅.
2. There exists a homogeneous structure of size 𝜅.
Very roughly, a homogeneous structure looks basically the same everywhere. More
precisely, if U is homogeneous, then any small substructure of U can be extended
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however we like to bigger small structures.39
Deﬁnition 6 If A ⊆ B and f ∶ A → U and g ∶ B → U are embeddings, then g






Figure 1: Extending an embedding
Deﬁnition 7 A structure U is homogeneous iff for any small structures A ⊆ B,
and any embedding f ∶ A → U, there is some embedding g ∶ B → U that
extends f.
Here’s the idea of the ﬁrst step. Suppose U is homogeneous, and let A be any struc-
ture of size at most 𝜅. We can build A up as the limit of an inﬁnite expanding chain
of small substructures A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ ⋯. Start with the trivial embedding of the
empty structure in U. Then we can use the homogeneity property to extend this
embedding to A0, and then extend it further to A1, and so on. This expanding chain
of embeddings also has a limit, and this is an embedding of A in U.
Let’s make this idea more precise.
Deﬁnition 8 Let 𝛼 be an ordinal. An 𝛼-chain is a sequence of structures Ai for
each ordinal i < 𝛼, such that Ai ⊆ Aj whenever i ≤  j < 𝛼.
Lemma 3 For any 𝛼-chain of structures Ai, there is a unique limit structure A+
such that, for any structure B, A+ ⊆ B iff Ai ⊆ B for every i < 𝛼. The limit of
a chain of structures is denoted limi<𝛼 Ai.
(In fact, the limit is the structure whose domain is the union of the domains of each
structure Ai, and for each F ∈ P the extension of F is the union of the extensions of
F in each structure Ai.)
We note without proof the following facts about limits. (These rely on our back-
ground assumption that 𝜅 is regular.)
39Our term “homogeneous” corresponds to what what Hodges calls “weak homogeneity”. In con-
trast, in Hodges’ terminology, an ultrahomogeneous structure S is one such that any isomorphism of small
substructures of S can be extended to an automorphism of S. The short label “homogeneous” is of-
ten used for this property instead—which is not too bad, because for structures no larger than 𝜅, the
properties turn out to be equivalent (see Hodges 1997, Lemma 6.1.4 for the countable case).
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Lemma 4 Let A+ be the limit of an 𝛼-chain of small structures Ai.
(a) |A+| ≤ 𝜅. If 𝛼 < 𝜅, then A+ is small.
(b) If B is a small structure and f ∶ B → A+ is an embedding, then for some
i < 𝜅, f also embeds B in Ai.
(c) For any structure A such that |A| ≤  𝜅, A is the limit of some 𝜅-chain of
small structures.
Deﬁnition 9 For an 𝛼-chain of structures Ai, a chain of embeddings of Ai in B
is a sequence of embeddings fi ∶ Ai → B for i < 𝛼, such that fj extends fi
whenever i ≤ j < 𝛼.
Lemma 5 For any chain of embeddings fi ∶ Ai → B, there is a limit embedding
g ∶ limi Ai → B that extends each embedding fi (ﬁgure 2).









Figure 2: A limit of a chain of embeddings
Now we have the tools to prove the ﬁrst step of the main theorem.
Lemma 6 If U is homogeneous, then U embeds every structure of size at most 𝜅.
Proof. Suppose A is a structure of size at most 𝜅. Then A is a limit of some 𝜅-
chain of small structures Ai. We can use homogeneity to inductively construct a
corresponding chain of embeddings fi ∶ Ai → U. Let i < 𝜅, and suppose for the
inductive hypothesis that we already have a chain of embeddings fj ∶ Aj → U for
j < i. Let B = limj<i Aj, and let g be the limit of the chain of embeddings fj. Then
B is a substructure of Ai, and g is an embedding of B in U. By homogeneity, we can
extend g to an embedding fi ∶ Ai → U. In this way we can inductively construct a
𝜅-chain of embeddings of the structures Ai in U. Then the limit of this chain is an
embedding of the limit structure A in U.  
The second step—the construction of a homogeneous structure—relies on an addi-
tional structure-theoretic operation, which is called amalgamation. This is a kind
of “paste with overlap”. Suppose that we have two structures B and C with a “com-
mon part”, in the sense that some substructure of B is isomorphic to a substructure
of C. Then we can glue B and C together in a way that respects their common part.
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Lemma 7 (The Amalgamation Property) Suppose A, B, and C are small struc-
tures, A ⊆ B, and f ∶ A → C is an embedding. Then there is a small structure








Note that in the special case where A is the empty structure, the Amalgamation
Property just says that B and C can both be embedded in some structure D—so the
disjoint sum of B and C is a special case of amalgamation.40
We can use these ideas to build up a homogeneous structure in stages. First, we can
list all the small structures in a length-𝜅 sequence B0,B1,… (by Lemma 8 below).
We can use this to recursively deﬁne a chain of small structures. Start with the empty
structure. Given a structure S, we can consider all of the possible ways of extending
any of its small substructures to any of the ﬁrst i structures in the B-sequence. Then
we can extend S to a larger (but still small) structure S+ that extends all of these
substructures in all of these ways (Lemma 9). Go on this way through the whole
B-sequence, take the limit of the resulting 𝜅-chain, and we’re done.
Lemma 8 Suppose P is a signature with 𝜋 elements and 𝜅 > 𝜋 is inaccessible.
Then there are 𝜅 isomorphism types of P-structures with strictly fewer than
𝜅 elements.
Lemma 9 Let S be a small structure, and let Φ be a set of fewer than 𝜅 triples
(A,B, f) consisting of small structures A ⊆ B and an embedding f ∶ A → S.
Then there is a small structure S+ such that for each triple (A,B, f) ∈ Φ there
is an extension of f to an embedding g ∶ B → S+.
Proof Sketch. We can inductively deﬁne a chain of structures Si. We’ll start with
the initial structure S. Then we’ll repeatedly apply the Amalgamation Property:
taking each triple (A,B, f) one by one, we can extend the embedding of A in Si to
40In the jargon from category theory, disjoint sums, limits, and amalgamation are all colimits. Thus
many of the facts in this appendix can be subsumed under the fact that, for any relational signature
P, the category of P-structures with embeddings has all small colimits.
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an embedding of the larger structure B in Si+1. The ﬁnal structure S+ is the limit of
this chain.  
Lemma 10 There exists a homogeneous structure of size 𝜅.
Proof Sketch. By Lemma 8, there is a length-𝜅 sequence of small structures Bi, such
that every small structure is isomorphic to Bi for some i < 𝜅.
We’ll recursively deﬁne a chain of small structures Ui. For any ordinal i < 𝜅, ﬁrst
let S = limj<i Ui. Let Φ be the set of all triples (A,Bj, f) consisting of a substructure
A ⊆ Bj for some j < i, and an embedding f ∶ A → S. It can be checked that |Φ| < 𝜅,
so we can apply Lemma 9: there is a small structure Ui ⊇ S that appropriately
extends every embedding in Φ.
Now take the limit: let U = limi<𝜅 Ui. By Lemma 4, |U| ≤ 𝜅. (It’s also clear
that |U| ≥  𝜅, so U has exactly 𝜅 elements.) The last thing to check is that U
is homogeneous. This follows from the fact that, for any small structures A ⊆ B
and any embedding f ∶ A → U, the triple (A,B, f) showed up somewhere in the
construction (up to isomorphism).  
B Plural Structures
In this appendix we spell out some of the deﬁnitions used in section 4 and section 5,
and prove two key facts. The ﬁrst is the main impossibility result, Theorem 5, which
says that, for a signature including relations, there are more isomorphically distinct
plural structures on a certain domain than things in that domain. The second is
the main possibility result, Theorem 6, which says that there is a “universal” pure
plural structure which embeds every pure plural structure. (Note that while the
“possibility” theorem obviously relies on set theory, the “impossibility” theorem does
not, beyond some basic things about ordered tuples.)
We’ll use capital letters for plural variables, and for concision we’ll use the notation
x ∈ X to mean “x is one of the X’s”, and the notation {x ∣ 𝜑(x)} for the plural term
“those things x such that 𝜑(x)”—that is, for plural comprehension. Plural identity
X = Y means that each X is a Y and each Y is an X.
Recall that our plural quantiﬁers are to be understood as saying “there are zero or
more things” rather than “there are one or more things”. Nothing essentially turns
on this, but it makes various things easier to state. (Otherwise we would need to add
many caveats of the form “or else there is no x such that 𝜑(x).”)
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Deﬁnition 10 The X’s code a family of pluralities indexed by the I’s iff each
of the X’s is an ordered pair (i, x) for some i ∈ I. For each i ∈ I, let Xi = {x ∣
(i, x) ∈ X}.
Deﬁnition 11 The S’s code a plural P-structure iff the S’s code a family of
pluralities indexed by the elements of P∪ {Dom} (where Dom is the label for
the domain, some object which is not an element of P), and for each relation
F in P, the SF’s are ordered n-tuples of the SDom’s. The S-domain is SDom,
and the S-extension of F is SF.
(“The S-domain” and “the S-extension of F” are really plural terms.)
Deﬁnition 12 (a) TheX’s code a plural function from the A’s to the B’s iff the
X’s are ordered pairs such that, for each a among the A’s, there is exactly
one b such that (a, b) is among the X’s. Let X(a) denote this unique b.
(b) The X’s are one-to-one iff for any b among the B’s there is at most one
a among the A’s such that X(a) = b.
(c) TheX’s are onto iff for any b among the B’s there is at least one a among
the A’s such that X(a) = b.
Deﬁnition 13 Suppose the S1’s and the S2’s each code plural structures.
(a) The X’s code a plural embedding of S1 in S2 iff the X’s code a plu-
ral function from the domain of S1 to the domain of S2, the X’s are
one-to-one, and for any n-tuple (d1,…, dn) of things in the S1-domain,
(d1,…, dn) is in the S1-extension of F iff (X(d1),…,X(dn)) is in the S2-
extension of F.
(b) The X’s code a plural isomorphism from S1 to S2 iff the X’s code
an embedding of S1 in S2 and are onto.
We can also deﬁne disjoint embedding as before, using the same trick for represent-
ing indexed families of pluralities—this time, to represent an indexed family of plural
structures.
Deﬁnition 14 Consider a family of pluralities Si, where for each i ∈ I, the Si’s code
a plural P-structure. Let the S+’s code a plural structure. Then S+ disjointly
embeds the family of plural structures Si iff there are some X’s which code
a family of pluralities indexed by the I’s, such that (i) for each i among the I’s,
the Xi’s code an embedding from Si to S+, and (ii) for any distinct i ∈ I and
j ∈ I, there are no d and d′ such that Xi(d) = Xj(d′).
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Deﬁnition 15 Suppose the O’s are ordered pairs of D’s. The O’s well-order the
D’s iff, for any X’s among the D’s, there is a unique x ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ O
for every y ∈ X. (In other words, any D’s have a unique O-least element.)
Note that well-orderings are reﬂexive: if theO’s well-order theD’s, then (d, d) ∈ O for
each d ∈ D. (This follows from the deﬁnition by considering the singleton plurality
{d}.)
Theorem 5 (See section 4.) Let P be a polyadic signature. Let the S’s code a family
of plural P-structures indexed by the D’s. (That is, for each d among the D’s,
the Sd’s code some plural structure.) If the D’s can be well-ordered, then some
plural structure on the D’s is not isomorphic to Sd for any d.
It sufﬁces to handle the case where P includes a single dyadic relation, say zapping.
(Increasing the adicity of the relation or adding further relations to the signature
can only increase the number of isomorphically distinct structures.) If the Z’s are
ordered pairs of D’s, let (D,Z) be the plural structure that assigns the Z’s as the
extension of zapping.
Our proof of Theorem 5 relies on the following fact about well-orderings (which we
won’t prove here):
Lemma 11 (Rigidity Lemma) Suppose theO’s well-order theD’s. If the Z’s code
an isomorphism from (D,O) to (D,O), then Z(d) = d for every d ∈ D.
The proof also relies on the counting fact we discussed in section 4:
Cantor–Bernays Theorem Let the X’s code a family of pluralities indexed by
the D’s. Then there are (zero or more) D’s which are not the Xd’s for any d.
Proof of Theorem 5. First we’ll show that there is an isomorphically distinct plural
structure on theD’s for each plurality ofD’s; then we can apply the Cantor–Bernays
Theorem.
By hypothesis, there are O’s that well-order the D’s. For any X’s among the D’s, let
the OX’s be the O-pairs excluding just the identity pairs (x, x) for x ∈ X.
OX = {(x, y) ∈ O ∣ x ≠ y or x ∉ X}
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For any X’s and Y’s among the D’s, if the Z’s code an isomorphism from (D,OX)
to (D,OY), it follows that the Z’s also code an isomorphism from (D,O) to (D,O).
Thus, by the Rigidity Lemma, Z(d) = d for every d ∈ D’s—and so it follows that X’s
just are the Y’s. In short, if (D,OX) ≅ (D,OY) then X = Y.
Now suppose the S’s code a family of plural structures indexed by D. Then we
can construct a corresponding family of pluralities. If there are any Y’s such that
Sd ≅ (D,OY), let Xd = Y. (We just showed that there is at most one such plurality. If
there are no such Y’s, we can let the Xd’s be something arbitrary, such as all the D’s.)
By the Cantor–Bernays Theorem, there are some Y’s among the D’s such that, for
every d ∈ D, Xd ≠ Y. Thus (D,OY) is a plural structure which is not isomorphic to
Sd for any d ∈ D.  
That completes the impossibility result. Next we’ll outline a proof of the main pos-
sibility result.
Theorem 6 Given Global Choice, there exists a pure plural structure that embeds
every pure plural structure.
We can prove this by “pluralizing” the proof of Theorem 4. First, we can straight-
forwardly generalize the idea of a limit of a chain of structures to the case where we
have a very long “chain” of structures indexed by all of the ordinals.
Deﬁnition 16 (a) TheX’s code an absolute sequence iff theX’s code a plural
function from the ordinals: that is, for each ordinal i, there is exactly one
pair (i, x) among the X’s.
(b) The A’s code an absolute chain of structures iff the A’s code an
absolute sequence such that, for each ordinal i, Ai is a (set) structure,
and Ai is a substructure of Aj for any ordinals i ≤ j.
(c) The F’s code an absolute chain of embeddings iff for each ordinal
i, Fi is a (set) embedding and Fj extends Fi for any ordinals i ≤ j.
In general, an absolute chain of set structures may have no set structure as a limit—
the structures may eventually exceed the size of any particular set. But even an
absolute chain will still have a plural structure as a limit, which is given by taking all
together everything which is part of the domain of any structure Ai.
Lemma 12 (a) For any absolute chain of pure set structures Ai, there is a unique
pure plural structure A+, the limit of the chain limi Ai, such that for any
plural structure B, A+ is a (plural) substructure of B iff Ai is a substructure
of B for every ordinal i.
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(b) For any absolute chain of (set) embeddings fi ∶ Ai → B, there is a unique
plural embedding of limi Ai in B that extends fi for every ordinal i.
Furthermore, the “absolute inﬁnity” which is the length of the ordinals has the same
relevant features as inaccessible cardinals that make the construction of a universal
structure work. We can run things essentially as before, understanding “small” to
mean “set-sized”. For example:
Lemma 13 (a) Given Global Choice, every pure plural structure is a limit of
some absolute chain of set structures.
(b) If A is the limit of an absolute chain of set structures Ai, then any set-
substructure of A is also a substructure of Ai for some ordinal i.
Lemma 14 Suppose U is a homogeneous pure plural structure, in the sense that for
any set structures A ⊆ B, any embedding f ∶ A → U can be extended to an
embedding of B in U. Then U embeds every pure plural structure.
Proof Sketch. Suppose A is some pure plural structure. By Lemma 13, A is a limit of
an absolute chain of set structures Ai. Then as in Lemma 6, we can construct an
absolute chain of embeddings fi ∶ Ai → U. The limit is a plural embedding of A in
U.  
Then we can construct a homogeneous pure plural structure by exactly the same
method as Lemma 10, as the limit of an absolute chain of set structures. Each
element of the chain is guaranteed to permit extensions of a certain set of (A,B, f)
triples. As in the set case, the limit of this absolute chain satisﬁes the homogeneity
property for every such triple. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.
Corollary 2 Given Limitation of Size, there exists a plural structure that embeds
every plural structure.
Proof. Limitation of Size guarantees that every plural structure is isomorphic to
some pure plural structure, and thus is embeddable in the universal plural structure
of Theorem 6. (Since Global Choice follows from Limitation of Size, we don’t need
to include this as an additional hypothesis.)  
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